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The Religious Freedom Restoration Act 
Douglas Laycock* 
The proposed Religious Freedom Restoration Act1 (RFRA) 
is a legislative response to the Supreme Court's decision in 
Employment Division v. Smith: which held that federal courts 
cannot protect the exercise of religion from formally neutral 
and generally applicable laws. In  effect, the Court held that 
every American has a right to believe in a religion, but no right 
to practice it. Religion cannot be singled out for discriminatory 
regulation, but i t  is f d y  subject to the entire body of secular 
regulation. 
In a pervasively regulated society, Smith means that 
religion will be pervasively regulated. In  a society where 
regulation is driven by interest group politics, Smith means 
that churches will be embroiled in endless political battles with 
secular interest groups. In a nation that sometimes claims to 
have been founded for religious liberty, Smith means that 
Americans will suffer for conscience. 
RFRA would greatly ameliorate these consequences. The 
bill would enad  a statutory version of the Free Exercise 
Clause. The bill can work only if it is as broad as the Free 
Exercise Clause, establishing the fundamental principle of 
religious liberty and leaving particular disputes to further 
litigation. 
Introduced with bipartisan sponsorship in both Houses of 
Congress, supported by President Clinton, and endorsed by its 
most influential former opponent, the United States Catholic 
Conference, RFRA may finally be on the way to passage after 
* Alice McKean Young Regents Chair in Law and Associate Dean for 
Research, The University of Texas Law School. The author participated in the 
drafting of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act and testified in support of the 
Act before committees in both the Senate and the House of Representatives. 
1. S. 578 & H.R. 1308, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993), available in LEXIS, Legis 
Library, BLTEXT File. 
2. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
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three years of deadlock. This article reviews the need for 
RFRA, some questions about its interpretation, the disputes 
that have delayed its enactment for so long, and the 
constitutional source of congressional power to enact the bill. 
The founding generation of Americans had a vision of a 
society in which religion would be entirely voluntary and 
entirely free. People of all faiths and of none would be welcome. 
Minority religions would be entitled not merely to grudging 
toleration, but to freely and openly exercise their religion. Even 
in their largely unregulated society, the Founders understood 
that the free exercise of religion sometimes required religious 
exemptions from formally neutral laws.3 Guarantees of free 
exercise and disestablishment were written into our 
fundamental law in state and federal constitutions. The 
simultaneous American innovation of judicial review made 
those guarantees legally enforceable. 
The religion clauses represent both a legal guarantee of 
religious liberty and a political commitment to religious liberty. 
The religion clauses made America a beacon of hope for 
religious minorities throughout the world. The extent of 
religious pluralism in this country, and of legal and political 
protections for religious minorities, is probably unsurpassed in 
human experience. Religious liberty is one of America's great 
contributions to civilization. 
But a counter-tradition also runs through American 
history; we have not always lived up to our ideals. There has 
been religious intolerance and even religious persecution. The 
New England theocracy expelled dissenters, executed Quaker 
missionaries who returned, and, most infamously, perpetrated 
the Salem witch trials. Colonial Virginia imprisoned Baptist 
ministers for preaching without a license. American 
slaveowners totally suppressed African religion among the 
slaves, in what one historian has called "the African spiritual 
holo~aust."~ 
Hostility to Catholics produced anti-Catholic political 
movements, mob violence, and church burnings in the 
3. Michael W. McCo~eu,  The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free 
Exercise of Religion, 103 HARv. L. REV. 1409, 1466-73 (1990). 
4. JON BUTLER, AWASH IN A SEA OF FAITH 129-63 (1990). 
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nineteenth century. Catholic children were beaten for refusing 
to read the Protestant Bible in public schools. In the 1920s, the 
Ku Klux Klan and other Nativist groups pushed through a law 
in Oregon requiring all children to attend public schools; the 
effect would have been to  close the Catholic  school^.^ 
The Mormons fled from New York, to Ohio, to Missouri, to 
Illinois, to  Utah. They were driven off their lands in Missouri 
by a combination of armed mobs and state militia. Their 
prophet was murdered by a mob while he was in the custody of 
the State of Illinois. The federal government prosecuted 
hundreds of Mormons for polygamy, it imposed test oaths that 
denied Mormons the right to  vote, and finally it dissolved the 
Mormon Church and codiscated its property. The Supreme 
Court upheld all of these laws in a series of cases in the late 
nineteenth centuq? 
From the late 1930s to the early 1950s, towns all over 
America tried to stop the Jehovah's Witnesses from 
proselytizing. These towns enacted a remarkable variety of 
ordinances, most of which were eventually struck down. The 
Supreme Court's decision in Minersville School District v. 
Gobitis,' upholding the requirement that Jehovah's Witnesses 
salute the flag, triggered a nationwide outburst of private 
violence against the Witnesses.' Jehovah's Witness children 
were beaten on American school grounds? 
This thumbnail sketch of religious intolerance in American 
history is relevant to RFRA for two reasons. First, history 
shows that even in America government cannot always be 
trusted to  protect religious liberty. Judicial enforcement of free 
exercise is not foolproof either, but it is an important additional 
safeguard. 
This history of religious intolerance is also relevant in a 
more specific way: formally neutral, generally applicable 
laws-the kind that raise no constitutional issue after Smith- 
were central to three of the worst episodes of religious 
persecution in our history. The law that would have closed all 
the Catholic schools in Oregon was a formally neutral, 
5. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925). 
6. Late Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. United 
States, 136 US. 1 (1890); Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890); Reynolds v. 
United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878). 
7. 310 U.S. 586 (1940). 
8. PETER IRONS, THE COURAGE OF THEIR CONVICTIONS 22-23, 31 (1988). 
9. Id. at 30; see also id. at 33. 
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generally applicable law. The polygamy law that underlay 
much of the Mormon persecution was a formally neutral, 
generally applicable law. The flag salute law invoked against 
Jehovah's Witnesses was a formally neutral, generally 
applicable law. 
The Supreme Court upheld the polygamy law in Reynolds 
v. United States.'' I t  upheld the flag salute law in Gobitis, 
although it later struck down a similar law under the Free 
Speech Clause." Reynolds and Gobitis are the two precedents 
on which the Court principally relied in Smith; the Court was 
simply oblivious to the shameful historical episodes of which 
these cases were a part. The law closing Catholic schools was 
struck down in Pierce v. Society of Sisters,12 a decision cast in 
serious doubt by Smith. If Pierce survives, it rests on an  
unenumerated right of parents to educate their children13-a 
precarious base indeed. 
In only one of these three episodes was the formally 
neutral law originally enacted for the purpose of persecuting a 
religious minority: The law closing private schools in Oregon 
was enacted to harm the Catholics. But polygamy laws were 
not enacted to get the Mormons, and flag salute laws were not 
enacted to get the Jehovah's Witnesses. These laws were 
originally enacted for legitimate reasons, but when they were 
enforced against religious minorities, they fanned the flames of 
persecution. 
Congress can find as a fact that formally neutral, generally 
applicable laws have repeatedly been the instruments of 
religious persecution, even in America. Formally neutral laws 
can lead to persecution for a simple reason: Once government 
demands that religious minorities conform their behavior to 
secular standards, there is no logical stopping point to that 
demand. Conscientious resistance by religious minorities 
sometimes inspires respectful tolerance and exemptions, but 
sometimes it inspires religious hatred and determined, 
systematic efforts to suppress the religious minority. 
I mention the history of religious persecution because that 
10. 98 U.S. 145 (1878). 
11. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 US. 624 (1943). 
12. 268 U.S. 510 (1925). 
13. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881 (1990). 
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possibility cannot be assumed away. But deliberate persecution 
is not the usual problem in this country. Religious 
organizations and believers can lose the right to  practice their 
faith for a whole range of reasons: because their practice 
offends some interest group that successfully insists on a 
regulatory law with no exceptions, because the secular 
bureaucracy is indifferent to their needs, or because the 
legislature was unaware of their existence and failed to provide 
an exemption. Some interest groups and individual citizens are 
aggressively hostile to particular religious teachings, or t o  
religion in general. Others are not hostile, but simply cannot 
understand the need to exempt religion. But whether 
regulation results from hostility, indifference, or ignorance, the 
consequence to believers is the same. 
All of these problems are aggravated by the reaction to  
Smith in the lower courts, in government bureaus, and among 
secular interest groups. Many judges, bureaucrats, and 
activists have taken Smith as a signal that the Free Exercise 
Clause is largely repealed, and that the needs of* religious 
minorities are no longer entitled to  any consideration. I briefly 
discuss some contemporary examples. 
Culturally conservative churches, including Catholics, 
conservative Protestants, Orthodox Jews, and Mormons, are 
under constant attack on issues related t o  abortion, 
homosexuality, ordination of women, and moral standards for 
sexual behavior. The most aggressive elements of the pro- 
choice, gay rights, and feminist movements are not content to  
prevail in the larger society; they also want to impose their 
agenda on dissenting churches. Sometimes they succeed. St. 
Agnes Hospital in Baltimore had a residency program in 
obstetrics and gynecology, but the program lost its 
accreditation because the hospital refused to  perform abortions 
or teach doctors how to do them." There has been recurring 
litigation, with mixed results, between churches and gay rights 
14. St. Agnes Hosp. v. Riddick, 748 F. Supp. 319 (D. Md. 1990). Riddick was 
decided without reference to Smith, on the basis of a seriously diluted version of 
the compelling interest test. Under Smith, the law is valid without regard to the 
weight of the state's interest. To accomplish its purpose, RFRA must restore the 
original understanding of the compelling interest test, as set out in Sherbert v. 
Verner, 374 US. 398 (1963), Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), and Thomas 
v. Review Board, 450 U.S. 707 (1981). See infra part V. RFRA does not codify 
cases such as Riddick, which apply a lower standard and call it compelling 
interest. 
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 organization^.'^ But the opinion in Smith is reasonably clear: 
Any well-drafted gay rights ordinance would be a facially 
neutral law of general applicability, and the Free Exercise 
Clause will not exempt religious organizations. These recurring 
conflicts over sexual morality are the most obvious examples of 
interest group attacks on religious liberty. 
The problem of bureaucratic inflexibility is illustrated by 
one of the saddest cases since Smith, a case involving an  
unauthorized autopsy. Several minority religions in America 
have strong teachings against mutilation of the human body, 
and they view autopsies as a form of mutilation. Faith groups 
with such teachings include many Jews, Navajo Indians, and 
the Hmong, an immigrant population from Laos. The Hmong 
believe that if an  autopsy is performed, the spirit of the 
deceased will never be free. 
In  Yang u. Sturner,16 a distressed district judge held that  
Smith left him powerless to do anything about an  unnecessary 
autopsy performed on a young Hmong man. The judge 
movingly described the deep grief of the victim's family, the 
obvious emotional pain of the many Hmongs who came to 
witness the trial, and his own deep regret at being forced to 
uphold a profound violation of their religious liberty. He 
describes an autopsy done largely out of medical curiosity, with 
no suspicion of foul play, with no authorization in Rhode Island 
law, and without the slightest regard for the family's religious 
beliefs." But under Smith, the state does not need a good 
reason, or even any reason at all. There is simply no 
substantive constitutional right to religious liberty after Smith. 
An example of old-fashioned religious prejudice is Munn u. 
Algee,18 a suit for the wrongful death of Elaine Munn. Mrs. 
Munn was killed in an  automobile accident in which the other 
driver admitted fault. In  accord with her Jehovah's Witness 
faith, Mrs. Munn refused a blood transfusion; the doctors 
disagreed sharply over whether a transfusion would have done 
any good. The defendant driver's insurance company 
15. See Walker v. First Orthodox Presbyterian Church, 22 Fair Empl. Prac. 
Cas. (BNA) 762 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1980); Gay Rights Coalition v. Georgetown Univ., 
536 A.2d 1 (D.C. 1987); Dignity Twin Cities v. Newman Ctr. & Chapel, 472 
N.W.2d 355 (Mim. Ct. App. 1991). 
16. 750 F. Supp. 558 (D.R.I. 1990). 
17. Yang v. Sturner, 728 F. Supp. 845, 846-47, 853-57 (D.R.I.), withdrawn, 750 
F. Supp. 558 (D.R.I. 1990). 
18. 924 F.2d 568 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 277 (1991). 
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successfidly argued that Mrs. Munn was responsible for her 
own death, because she refused the blood transfusion. Citing 
Smith, the court of appeals held that she had no right to refuse 
a blood transfusion.19 
Even worse, the insurance company was permitted to 
attack a wide range of other Jehovah's Witness teachings as 
unpatriotic, narrow-minded, or strange. The insurance company 
forced Mr. Munn to testify about the Jehovah's Witness belief 
that Christ returned to earth in 1914, their belief that the 
world will end at Armageddon and that only Jehovah's 
Witnesses will be spared destruction, their belief that there is 
no hell, and their conscientious refusal to  serve in the military 
or salute the flag. This case was tried t o  a mostly white 
Mississippi jury at the height of the political controversy over 
flag burning. The Munn family is black, and the insurance 
company successfully excluded all but one of the black jurors. 
The jury awarded no damages for Mrs. Munn's death, and only 
token damages for Mr. Munn's injuries and for Mrs. Munn's 
pain and suffering prior to death. 
Astonishingly, the court of appeals upheld the jury's 
verdict. One judge thought the attack on Jehovah's Witness 
teachings was relevant and entirely proper.20 A second judge 
thought these attacks were so obviously irrelevant that they 
could not have affected the jury's  deliberation^.^' For these 
wholly inconsistent reasons, the Munns were left with only 
token compensation. This trial was surely unconstitutional 
even after Smith, but the Supreme Court denied certiorari. The 
case illustrates the symbolic consequences of Smith: there is a 
widespread impression that religious minorities simply have no 
constitutional rights anymore. 
Yang and Munn illustrate another important point. The 
Munns were black; the Yangs were Hmong. Racial and ethnic 
minorities are often also religious minorities. The civil rights 
laws are to little avail unless they provide for religious liberty 
as well as for racial and ethnic justice. 
Not even mainstream churches can count on sympathetic 
regulation. Cornerstone Bible Church in Hastings, Minnesota 
was zoned out of town and left without a place to  worship. 
Applying Smith, the district court upheld the exclusionary 
19. Id. at 574. 
20. Id. at 579 (Barksdale, J., concurring). 
21. Id. at 572 n.6 (opinion of Smith, J.). 
228 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW R;EVIEW [I993 
zoning, equating the zoning rights of churches with the zoning 
rights of pornographic movie theaterd2 The court of appeals 
held that Cornerstone is entitled to a new trial, but its opinion 
did not solve either Cornerstone's problem or the zoning 
problems of other churches. The court of appeals held that 
cities need have only a rational basis for excluding churches 
from town. In spite of clear evidence of discrimination against 
churches, the court refused to apply the compelling interest 
test.23 
Cornerstone's problem with hostile zoning is not unique. 
Restrictive zoning laws are often enforced with indifference to 
religious needs-and sometimes with outright hostility to the 
presence of churches. Zoning laws have been invoked to 
prevent new activities in existing churches and synagogues, t o  
limit the architecture of churches and synagogues, to exclude 
minority faiths such as Islam and Buddhism, and to prevent 
churches and synagogues from being built at all in new 
suburban cornm~nities.~~ Most major American religions teach 
some duty to feed the hungry, clothe the naked, and shelter the 
homeless; but when a church or synagogue tries to act on such 
teachings, it is likely to get a complaint from the neighbors and 
a citation from the zoning board. In the zoning cases, the 
problem is not that the church has a doctrinal tenet or moral 
teaching that directly conflicts with the policy of the law. 
Rather, the problem is simply that the law restricts the 
church's ability to carry out its mission. Religious exercise is 
not free when churches cannot locate in new communities, or 
when existing churches cannot define their own mission. The 
free exercise of religion under RFRA must include the churches' 
definition and pursuit of their own religious missions and 
management of their own internal affairs. 
The Supreme Court has held that legislatures may exempt 
religious exercise from formally neutral laws.25 But individual 
22. Cornerstone Bible Church v. City of Hastings, 740 F. Supp. 654, 663 (D. 
Minn. 1990), affd in part, rev'd in part, 948 F.2d 464 (8th Cir. 1991). 
23. Cornerstone Bible Church v. City of Hastings, 948 F.2d 464, 472 11.13 (8th 
Cir. 1991). 
24. For accounts of these cases, see R. Gustav Niebuhr, Here Is the Church; As 
for the People, They're Picketing It, WALL ST. J., Nov. 20, 1991, at Al. 
25. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990); Corporation of the 
Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 334-40 (1987). 
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exemptions, obtained one statute at a time, are not a workable 
means of protecting religious liberty. In each request for a 
legislative exemption, churches are likely to  find an aroused 
interest group on the other side, and they will be trying to 
amend that interest group's statute. Such battles can be 
endless. The fight over student gay rights groups at 
Georgetown University resulted in ten published judicial orders 
and two acts of Congres~.~~ 
Churches have to  win these battles over and over, at every 
level of government. They have to avoid being regulated by the 
Congress, by the state legislatures, by the county commissions, 
by the city councils, and by the administrative agencies at each 
of these levels. Churches have to avoid being regulated this 
year and next year and every year after that. If they lose even 
once in any forum, they have lost the war; their religious 
practice is subject to  regulatory interference. This is not a 
workable means of protecting religious liberty. 
It is important to understand that every religion is at risk. 
Every church offends some interest group, and many churches 
offend numerous interest groups. No church is big enough or 
tough enough to fight them all off, over and over, at every level 
of government. The situation is even more hopeless for 
individual believers with special needs not shared by their 
whole denomination. Consider the case of Frances Quaring, a 
Pentecostal Christian who studied the Bible on her own and 
understood the commandment against graven images with 
unusual stri~tness.~' Mrs. Quaring would not allow a 
photograph in her house. She would not allow a television in 
her house. She removed the labels from her groceries or 
obliterated the pictures with black markers. For Mrs. Quaring, 
it was plainly forbidden to  carry a photograph on her driver's 
license, and when the legislature required photographs, she 
could not get a driver's license.28 
It would be nearly impossible for any legislature to know 
in advance about a believer like Mrs. Quaring and to enact an 
exemption for her. The Mrs. Quarings of the world cannot hire 
lobbyists to monitor the legislature and protect their religious 
26. The judicial and legislative history is summarized in Clarke v. United 
States, 915 F.2d 699, 700 (D.C. Cir. 1990). 
27. Quaring v. Peterson, 728 F.2d 1121 (8th Cir. 1984), affd  by equally divided 
Court sub nom. Jensen v. Quaring, 472 US. 478 (1985). 
28. Id. at 1122-23. 
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liberty from any bill that might interfere with their little- 
known beliefs. The only way to provide for such unforeseeable 
religious claims is with a general provision guaranteeing free 
exercise of religion. The Free Exercise Clause was once such a 
provision, but Smith says that it is not such a provision 
anynore. RFRA would restore such a provision to the United 
States Code. 
RFRA would solve the problem of perpetual religious 
conflict with interest groups and also the problem of religious 
minorities too small to be heard in the legislature. I t  would do 
so by creating an  across-the-board right to argue for religious 
exemptions and make the government carry the burden of proof 
when it claims that it cannot afford to grant exemptions. RFRA 
has a chance to work because it is as universal as the Free 
Exercise Clause. It treats every religious faith and every 
government interest equally, granting neither special favors 
nor exceptions for any group. RFRA is America's only near- 
term hope to rise above the paralysis of interest group politics 
and restore protection for religious liberty. 
Religious liberty is popular in principle, but in specific 
applications it quickly becomes entangled in other issues. 
Government bureaucrats would never admit that they are 
against religious liberty, but nearly all of them think their own 
program is so important that no religious exception can be 
tolerated. Few interest groups admit that they are against 
religious liberty, but almost every interest group thinks its own 
agenda is so important that no religious exception can be 
tolerated. The religious community itself is divided on many 
issues raised by secular interest groups, and denominations 
sometimes find it hard to speak out when a bill pits their 
commitment to religious liberty against their commitment to 
some other principle. RFRA's across-the-board feature attempts 
to cut through all of this special pleading. 
In most of these conflicts between religious liberty and 
secular interest groups, an exemption for religious liberty does 
little or no damage to any legitimate secular goals. The interest 
group that succeeds in  enacting a bill would get its way in 95% 
or 98% or 99.9% of the cases; the religious exemption merely 
creates a small enclave of conscience for religious dissenters. 
But to get those exemptions statute by statute requires 
political and legislative battles that can be both enormously 
divisive and very expensive. Congress is the greatest expert on 
the legislative process; it knows the practical realities of 
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interest group politics. Congress can find as a fact that specific 
exemptions enacted one statute a t  a time are not a workable 
means of protecting the free exercise of religion. 
RFRA would permit religious liberty to be burdened only 
when that burden is the least restrictive means to serve a 
compelling governmental interest. The compelling interest test 
takes meaning from the Supreme Court's earlier cases, and 
especially from the congressional finding that "the compelling 
interest as set forth in Sherbert v. Verner and Wisconsin v. 
Yoder is a workable test for striking sensible balances between 
religious liberty and competing governmental interests.'" 
This statement of purpose is important to the bill. 
Even before Smith, the Court had been criticized for 
excessive deference to governmental agencies in free exercise 
cases. But most of these deferential decisions were not decided 
under the compelling interest test at all, either because the 
Court found no burden on religious exerciseS0 or because it 
created exceptions to the compelling interest test.31 These 
cases cast no light on the meaning of the compelling interest 
test. 
Sherbert and Yoder, the two cases expressly mentioned in 
the bill, were part of a series of free exercise cases that 
rigorously enforced the compelling interest test. Most 
legitimate governmental interests are  not compelling. 
"Compelling" does not mean merely a "reasonable means of 
promoting a legitimate public interest."32 Nor does it mean 
merely important.33 Rather, "compelling interests" include 
only those few interests "of the highest order,"34 or in  a 
similar formulation, "[o]nly the gravest abuses, endangering 
29. H.R. 1308, supra note 1, $ 2(a)(5); see also S. 578, supra note 1, $ 2(b)(1) 
(stating that one purpose of the Act is "to restore the compelling interest test as 
set forth in Sherbert v. Verner and Wisconsin v. Yoder" (citations omitted)). 
30. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 447-53 
(1988); Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 699-701 (1986). 
31. O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 349-50 (1987) (prisons); 
Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 507-08 (1986) (military). 
32. Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136, 141 (1987) 
(rejecting a test proposed in the plurality opinion in Bowen, 476 U.S. a t  708 
(Burger, C.J.)). 
33. Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 718-19 (1981). 
34. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 888 (1990); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 
406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972). 
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paramount  interest^."^^ The Supreme Court explains 
"compelling" with superlatives like "paramount ," "gravest," and 
"highest." Even these interests are sufficient only if they are 
"not otherwise served,"36 if "no alternative forms of regulation 
would combat such abuses,"37 if the challenged law is "the 
least restrictive means of achieving" the compelling interest:' 
and if the government pursues its alleged interest uniformly 
across the full range of similar conduct.3g Even Smith 
cautions against diluting the test: "[Ilf 'compelling interest7 
really means what it says (and watering it down here would 
subvert its rigor in the other fields where it is applied), many 
laws will not meet the test."40 
The stringency of the compelling interest test appears most 
clearly in Wisconsin u. Yoder , which invalidated Wisconsin's 
compulsory education laws as applied to Amish children.41 
The education of children is important, and the first two years 
of high school are basic to that interest, but the State's interest 
in the first two years of high school was not sufficiently 
compelling to justify a serious burden on free exercise.42 
The unemployment compensation cases also illustrate the 
point. The government's interest in saving money is legitimate, 
but it is not sufficiently compelling to justify refusing 
compensation to those whose religious faith disqualifies them 
from employ~nent.~~ 
Moreover, it is not enough for government to point to 
unconfirmed risks or fears. Defending its compulsory education 
law in Yoder, Wisconsin relied on the plausible fear that some 
Amish children would "choose to leave the Amish community7' 
and that they would "be ill-equipped for life.'"4 The Court 
rejected that fear as "highly speculative," demanding "specific 
evidence" that Amish adherents were leaving and that they 
35. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963) (quoting Thomas v. Collins, 
323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945)). 
36. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 215. 
37. Sherbert, 374 U.S. a t  407. 
38. Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981). 
39. Simon & Schuster, h c .  v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 
112 S. Ct. 501, 509-11 (1991); Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 540-41 (1989). 
40. Smith, 494 U.S. at 888. 
41. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 219-29. 
42. Id. 
43. . Sherbert, 374 U.S. a t  406-09 (Seventh-Day Adventist discharged by her 
employer because she would not work on Saturday). 
44. Yoder, 406 US. at 224. 
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were "doomed to become burdens on society."45 Similarly, 
various states have feared that a combination of false claims 
and honest adoption of religious objections to work would dilute 
unemployment compensation funds, hinder the scheduling of 
weekend work, increase unemployment, and encourage 
employers to make intrusive inquiries into the religious beliefs 
of job applicants. Some of these fears were plausible; some 
were not. But the Supreme Court rejected them all for lack of 
evidence that they were really happening? 
The lesson of the Court's cases is that government must 
show some interest more compelling than saving money or 
educating Amish children. Such is the compelling interest test 
of Sherbert and Yoder, and thus of RFRA. The Supreme Court 
has found a compelling interest in only three free exercise 
cases. In each of these cases, strong reasons of self-interest or 
prejudice threatened unmanageable numbers of false claims to 
exemption, and the laws a t  issue were essential to national 
survival or to express constitutional norms: national defenseP7 
collection of revenuep8 and racial equality in education:' 
The stringency of the compelling interest test makes sense 
in light of its origins; it is a judicially implied exception to the 
constitutional text.50 The Constitution does not say that 
government may prohibit free exercise for compelling reasons. 
Rather, the Constitution says absolutely that there shall be "no 
law" prohibiting free exercise of religi~n.~' The implied 
exception is based on necessity, and its rationale runs no 
further than cases of clear necessity. RFRA makes the 
exception explicit rather than implicit, but the stringent 
standard for satisfying the exception should not change. 
VI. THE ABORTION, TAX, AND FUNDING OBJECTIONS 
The principal opposition to RFRA has centered on a 
demand for provisos stating that the bill would create no cause 
45. Id. at 224-25. 
46. Frazee v. Illinois Dep't of Employment Sec., 489 U.S. 829, 835 (1989); 
Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 718-19 (1981); Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 407. 
47. Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971). 
48. United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982). 
49. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983). 
50. Douglas Laycock, Notes on the Role of Judicial Review, the Expansion of 
Federal Power, and the Structure of Constitutional Rights, 99 YALE L.J. 1711, 1744- 
45 (1990) (book review). 
51. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
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of action to challenge laws restricting abortion, no cause of 
action to challenge the use or disposition of public funds or 
property, and no cause of action to challenge the tax status of 
any other person.52 These proposed amendments injected into 
the RFRA debate highly divisive and mostly irrelevant 
controversies over abortion, public funding of religious 
institutions, and tax exemptions for religious institutions. The 
bill failed to move for nearly three years because of deadlock 
over these proposed amendments. If those demanding these 
amendments had deliberately set out to prevent RFRA's 
enactment, they could not have chosen a better way to  succeed. 
The deadlock was apparently resolved in March, 1993. The 
bill was introduced in both Houses of Congress with a new 
proviso, stating that tax exemptions and public funding do not 
violate RFRA unless they also violate the Establishment 
Clause." This amendment would recognize that these issues 
have always been resolved under other law that directly 
addresses these very questions, and that the other, more 
relevant law should continue to  control. There is also tentative 
agreement to state in the legislative history that RFRA does 
not expand any right to religiously motivated abortions that 
may have existed prior to Smith. In return for these provisions, 
the United States Catholic Conference, by far the largest and 
most influential group previously opposed, has now endorsed 
the b W 4  
In addition, President Clinton has endorsed the bill.55 The 
abortion controversy had kept President Bush neutral, caught 
between that part of his pro-life constituency that opposed the 
bill on abortion grounds and that part of his pro-life and 
evangelical constituency that strongly supported the bill. The 
bill has long been supported by such staunchly pro-life groups 
as the National Association of Evangelicals, the Christian Life 
Commission of the Southern Baptist Convention, the Church of 
Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, and the Home School Legal 
Defense Fund.56 But so long as the bill had strong pro-life 
52. These provisos were included in a competing bill in the 102d Congress. See 
H.R. 4040 8 3(cX2), 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992). 
53. H.R. 1308, supra note 1, 8 7; S. 578, supra note 1, 8 7. 
54. Letter from Frank J. Monahan, Director, Office of Government Liaison, 
United States Catholic Conference, to Senator Edward K e ~ e d y  (March 9, 1993) 
(on file with the B.Y.U. Law Review). 
55. Letter from President William Clinton to Senator Edward Kennedy (March 
11, 1993) (on file with the B.Y.U. Law Review). 
56. See, e.g., The Religous Freedom Restoration Act: Hearing on S. 2969 Before 
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opposition, there was a risk of a Bush veto. With the veto 
threat removed and with powerful new endorsements from 
President Clinton and the U.S. Catholic Conference, the bill 
should move. It may even be law by the time this article is 
published; it passed the House unanimously on May 11, 
1993:~ and was approved by the Senate Judiciary Committee 
by a vote of fifteen to one.58 But if the compromise falls 
through, any amendments on abortion, tax exemptions, or 
public funding should be rejected. 
The principle of RFRA is that it enacts a statutory version 
of the Free Exercise Clause. Like the Free Exercise Clause 
itself, RFRA is universal in its scope. RFRA singles out no 
claims for special advantage or disadvantage. I t  favors no 
religious claim over any other and no state interests over any 
other. RFRA simply enacts a universal standard: Burdens on 
religious exercise must be justified by compelling interests. 
Limiting the bill to enactment of the compelling 
governmental interest standard without the proposed 
amendments is a principled solution to the practical problem of 
disagreement over particular claims. If RFRA tries to resolve 
every possible conflict between a religious claim and a 
governmental interest, we will be caught up in the same 
morass of endless political conflict that we now face without 
RFRA. A bill limited to a statement of universal principle is 
neutral on all possible claims, including claims about abortion, 
tax exemption, and public hnding. I t  would return all religious 
claims to their pre-Smith position under the Free Exercise 
Clause, allowing each side to argue as they would have argued 
under Sherbert and Yoder. 
The proposed amendments would take a very different 
approach, codifying Smith insofar as it cut off the last shred of 
argument for certain claims that supporters of the amendments 
the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 154 (Restoring Religious 
Liberty in America: An Analysis of the Religious Freedom Restoration A d  by 
Coalitions for America) (full text on file with the B.Y.U. Law Review); Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act of 1991: Hearings on H.R. 2797 Before the Subcomm. on 
Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong., 
2d Sess. 10 (1992) ChereinaRer House Hearings] (statement of Robert Dugan, Jr., 
Director, Office of Public Affairs, National Association of Evangelicals); id. at 23 
(statement of Elder Dallin H. Oaks, Quorum of the Twelve Apostles, The Church 
of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints). 
57. 139 CONG. REC. H2356-63 (daily ed. May 11, 1993). 
58. 139 CONG. REC. D472 (daily ed. May 6, 1993); Adam Clymer, Congress 
Moves to Ease Curb on Religious Acts, N.Y. TIMES, May 10, 1993, a t  A9. 
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do not like. The amendments would provide that most religious 
claims are restored to where they would have been under the 
Free Exercise Clause, but that these three sets of claims are 
left subject to Smith. Whatever the merits of these 
amendments, they cannot be defended on the ground that they 
are neutral toward the three excluded sets of claims. 
These three amendments are enormously divisive, but the 
divisions are almost entirely symbolic. Each of the three 
amendments relates to  an issue that has always been litigated 
and decided under some other clause of the Constitution. The 
right to abortion has been principally litigated under the Due 
Process Clause, and most challenges to church tax exemption 
and to public funding for churches have been brought under 
the Establishment Clause. In each case, free exercise theories 
have been around for a long time, but the Supreme Court has 
rejected them. 
As the Court became more and more conservative, 
challenges to  abortion laws, church tax exemptions, and public 
funding for religious agencies received an increasingly hostile 
reception under any clause. As the litigants who brought these 
challenges became increasingly desperate, they experimented 
with alternative legal theories-and were unwilling to give up 
on any theory, however tenuous. Then, to everyone's great 
surprise, pro-choice forces won a dramatic victory in Planned 
Parenthood u. C~sey.~'  But win or lose, the reality is that 
changing the legal theory in their pleadings is not going to  
make the Court any more or less receptive to their claims. 
With or  without Smith, putting a free exercise label on a 
warmed-over abortion or Establishment Clause claim is quite 
unlikely to make any difference. 
The tax exemption issues have been largely resolved by 
cases already decided. The public funding issues will continue 
to be litigated under the Establishment Clause with or  without 
RFRA; and abortion rights are being defined in continuing due 
process litigation and in legislative debate over the pending 
Freedom of Choice Act. If the Court overrules Casey and Roe v. 
Wade:' i t  will be because of a fundamental jurisprudential 
judgment that the abortion issue is not appropriately resolved 
by judges-that "the answers to  most of the cruel questions 
posed are political and not juridical."' It is extraordinarily 
59. 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992). 
60. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
61. Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 532 (1989) (Scalia, J., 
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unlikely that the Court's judgment on that question would be 
affected by RFRA. 
A. Abortion 
Parts of the pro-choice movement have persistently assert- 
ed that restrictions on abortion violate the religion clauses of 
the First Amendment. I t  would follow fkom that argument that 
religiously motivated abortions are also protected by RFRA. 
But a claim to abortion rights under RFRA would matter only 
if other legal protections for abortion were eliminated. Casey 
and the election of a pro-choice President have dramatically 
changed predictions about the future of abortion law, but the 
issue for RFRA has not changed. Questions about the right to 
abortion will be decided on their own terms, and not under 
RFRA. 
Planned Parenthood v. Casey is an emphatic reaffirmation 
of the basic right to abortion. For the foreseeable future, there 
is a constitutional right to abortion and nothing in RFRA will 
affect that. If pro-life legislators kill RFRA, they will be com- 
pounding their defeat on abortion with a terrible defeat for 
religious liberty. Even from a single-issue pro-life perspective, 
RFRA is now more necessary than before, to protect pro-life 
hospitals and medical personnel from being forced to partici- 
pate in  abortion^.^' 
The bitterly divided opinions in Casey make the long-term 
future of abortion law dependent on legislation or future ap- 
pointments to the Court. The Casey dissenters will probably 
adhere to their dissent, and perhaps some future Justice will 
provide the fifth vote to overrule Casey as well as Roe. But one 
of the four dissenters has announced his retirement,63 so it 
now seems more likely that they will never get a fifth vote, and 
that the constitutional right to abortion will be a permanent 
part of our law. Either way, RFRA can add nothing to the right 
to abortion. 
The groups demanding an  abortion amendment to RFRA 
are worried about a most unlikely sequence of events: they fear 
that the Court might overrule Casey and Roe, and then re- 
concurring). 
62. See St. Agnes Hosp. v. Riddick, 748 F. Supp. 319 (D. Md. 1990); supra note 
14 and accompanying text. 
63. Linda Greenhouse, White Announces He'll Step Down from High Court, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar 20, 1993, at 1. 
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create abortion rights as a matter of free exercise under RFRA. 
These fears are groundless for several reasons. 
First, religion clause objections to restrictions on abortion 
are not new; they were presented to the Supreme Court in 
Harris u. McRae." There, the Court rejected the claim that 
abortion laws that coincide with religious teachings violate the 
Establishment Clause.65 It also held that no plaintiff in that 
case had standing to assert a free exercise claim because no 
plaintiff alleged that her religious beliefs compelled or motivat- 
ed her desire for an  abortion? The Court also held that a free 
exercise claim to abortion would depend on the religious beliefs 
of individual women, and that such a claim could not be assert- 
ed by an organi~ation.~' 
In the thirteen years since Harris, there has been no judi- 
cial movement toward a free exercise right to publicly funded 
abortions. If free exercise were a viable route for evading deci- 
sions upholding restrictions on abortion, someone should have 
come forward with plaintiffs who could satisfy the standing 
requirements laid down in Harris. Even though Harris does not 
formally resolve the free exercise issue, it has effectively re- 
solved the larger issue: the Court does not recognize any consti- 
tutional right to public funding for abortions. A decision over- 
ruling Casey and Roe would be equally effective in resolving 
the larger issue of any right to abortion. 
The standing rule in Harris is also a major victory for pro- 
life forces and a serious obstacle to pro-choice forces. The rule 
that  organizations lack standing to bring free exercise claims 
would logically apply to RFRA claims, and it would preclude 
broad-based RFRA challenges to abortion laws. Any RFRA 
challenge would have to proceed one woman a t  a time, with 
judicial examination of her individual beliefs. 
Second, a decision overruling Casey and Roe would almost 
certainly preclude a right to abortion under the Free Exercise 
Clause or RFRA. If Casey and Roe are overruled, the reason 
will be the government's interest in protecting unborn life. If 
the state's interest in protecting unborn life overrides reproduc- 
tive liberty under the Due Process Clause, that interest will be 
equally compelling under RFRA. Thus, even if the Court were 
64. 448 U.S. 297, 318-21 (1980). 
65. Id. at 319-20. 
66. Id. at 320-21. 
67. Id. 
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to hold that abortion can sometimes be religious exercise, the 
states' compelling interest in unborn life would override that 
right. 
It would make no difference if the Court said that the 
Constitution simply does not protect the right to choose abor- 
tion, thus distinguishing abortion from other constitutionally 
protected choices about family, reproduction, or bodily integrity. 
The basis for such a distinction could not be that abortion has 
nothing to do with reproduction or bodily integrity; rather, the 
only plausible reason for distinction is that the state's interest 
in unborn life changes the balance of competing interests. The 
four dissenters in Casey were explicit about this: "Unlike mar- 
riage, procreation and contraception, abortion 'involves the 
purposeful termination of potential life.' The abortion decision 
must therefore 'be recognized as sui generis, different in kind 
from the others that the Court has protected under the rubric 
of personal or family privacy and autonomy.' "" 
It has been suggested that the Court might read RFRA as 
codifying the rule that the interest in unborn life is not compel- 
ling, on the ground that this was the law at the time Congress 
acted. This outcome is implausible as well. The bill takes no 
position on whether any particular government interest is com- 
pelling. This silence is appropriate; Congress should not at- 
tempt to  resolve particular controversies in a bill about reli- 
gious exercise generally. 
The latest version of the abortion argument against RFRA 
is that it might be used to  evade the restrictions on abortion 
upheld in Casey. Like all the earlier versions, this argument 
depends on the fear that the Court will twice reverse its posi- 
tion on abortion, upholding new restrictions in Casey and then 
reversing that position on the basis of a statute that never 
mentions abortion. The argument further assumes that the 
Court will complete this double reversal even though its opin- 
ion in Casey gave extraordinary weight to stare decisis in the 
abortion context.69 
Such a double reversal is not a plausible outcome unless 
the statute clearly speaks to abortion and unambiguously di- 
rects the Court to reverse its position. RFRA does not do that; 
68. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2859 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting, joined .by White, 
Scalia & Thomas, JJ.) (first emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
69. Id. at 2814-16 (majority opinion) (fearing that any overruling on such a 
controversial issue would be perceived as caving in to political pressure). 
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it does not mention abortion, and its general language leaves 
the Court many escape routes. In Harris u. McRae, the Court 
was skeptical that many abortions are religiously motivated, 
and it can only be far more skeptical that many women have 
religious objections to twenty-four hour waiting periods or in- 
formed consent rules. 
If such rules are attacked not for their own religious signif'- 
icance, but because they burden the right to  a religiously moti- 
vated abortion, the Court is likely to hold that the compelling 
interest test is not triggered unless the burden on religion is 
substantial or undue. The plurality in Casey did not create its 
undue burden test out of thin air; rather it said that the right 
to abortion had been an unjustified exception to the general 
rule that only significant burdens on rights require justifica- 
tion. "As our jurisprudence relating to all liberties save perhaps 
abortion has recognized, not every law which makes a right 
more difficult to exercise is, @so facto, an infringement of that 
right.'770 The Court is quite likely to read this general princi- 
pal into RFRA, especially given Jimmy Swaggart Ministries u. 
Board of Equalization, where the Court assumed that burdens 
on religion are of no constitutional signIiicance unless they 
require the church or the believer to violate a particular doc- 
trinal tenet." The states' argument would be that waiting pe- 
riods, informed consent requirements, and the like do not vio- 
late religious tenets and do not unduly burden any right t o  
abortion, religiously motivated or otherwise. This is not the 
best interpretation of the statute-Swaggart's emphasis on 
violation of specific doctrinal tenets permits gross violations of 
religious libertyy2-but this is a possible interpretation gen- 
erally, and almost certainly the Court's interpretation in the 
abortion context. If the Court thinks that waiting periods, con- 
sent requirements, and the like are only minor burdens on 
abortion under the Constitution, there is no reason for it to  
suddenly think they are undue burdens under RFRA. 
There is a better way to reach the same result. The Court 
should not say that minor burdens on constitutional rights 
require no justification. Rather, it should say that minor bur- 
70. Id. at 2818 (plurality opinion). 
71. 493 US. 378, 391-92 (1990). 
72. See Douglas Laycock, The Remnants of Free Exercise, 1990 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 
23-28; see also the discussion of zoning cases supra notes 22-24 and accompanying 
text. 
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dens require justification proportionate to the burden-that the 
state's interest must compellingly outweigh the burden on the 
constitutional right. If the restrictions upheld in Casey are 
minor and easily justified burdens on abortion in general, they 
are equally minor and easily justified burdens on religiously 
motivated abortions. An implicit example of this sort of 
compelling-interest-balancing analysis appears in Burson v. 
Freeman, where a relatively modest restriction on political 
speech was upheld on the basis that a relatively modest state 
interest was ~ompel l ing .~~ 
It  is only common sense to recognize that a minor burden 
on a right may be justified by a less compelling interest than a 
total prohibition of the same right. Recognizing this point elim- 
inates the need to draw arbitrary lines between major and 
minor burdens, or between central and peripheral religious 
practices, and it eliminates the need for Swaggart's complete 
denial of protection to non-mandatory aspects of religious ob- 
servance. Requiring that the government's interest compelling- 
ly outweigh the burden on the protected right is the best inter- 
pretation of RFRA, and it would be the best interpretation of 
the compelling interest test in constitutional law generally. 
All doctrinal variations on the argument over abortion are 
subject to the overriding fact that Congress is explicitly consid- 
ering abortion in another bill. If Congress codifies anything 
about abortion, it will be in the Freedom of Choice Act.74 The 
Court knows N 1  well that Congress is as divided over abortion 
as the American people. It would be absurd to read a statute 
that never mentions abortion as somehow codifying the law of 
abortion, and more so when Congress in  the same session votes 
on an  express codification of the law of abortion. What is more, 
RFRA has both pro-life and pro-choice sponsors, making the 
argument even more absurd. A bill supported by a broad range 
of pro-life groups cannot sensibly be read as creating a right to 
abortion. 
If I were a pro-life legislator, I would turn out the largest 
possible pro-life vote for RFRA, and the largest possible pro-life 
vote against the Freedom of Choice Act, thereby unambiguous- 
ly making the record clear that the two bills are very 
73. 112 S. Ct. 1846, 1851-58 (1992) (plurality opinion) (upholding ban- on politi- 
cal solicitation within one hundred feet of polling place, to prevent fraud and in- 
timidation of voters). 
74. H.R. 25, H.R. 1068, & S. 25, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993). 
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different-that one takes a position on abortion and the other 
does not. And in working to turn out the pro-life vote on RFRA, 
I would emphasize one simple point: St. Agnes Hospital is a 
real case.75 A Catholic hospital has been forced to choose be- 
tween teaching and performing abortions or abandoning obstet- 
rics. By contrast, successful abortion claims under RFRA are 
imaginary-a theoretical possibility that depends on an ex- 
traordinarily unlikely combination of circumstances. 
Pro-life legislators must also understand that not all resis- 
tance to an abortion amendment comes from the pro-choice 
side. Agudath Israel, the Orthodox Jewish group that has been 
an  active part of the pro-life movement, insists that Jewish 
teaching mandates abortion in certain narrowly defined and 
exceptional cases.76 Any state prohibitions of abortion likely to 
be enacted will have exceptions for the cases that matter to 
Agudath Israel; its members do not expect to rely on RFRA. 
But neither can they accept their Christian coalition partners' 
dismissal of their sincere religious teachings as officially un- 
worthy of respect. Their loyal support for the pro-life move- 
ment, over the objection of most other Jewish organizations, 
entitles them to consideration in return from pro-life legisla- 
tors. 
Even though there is little merit to claims of a free exer- 
cise right to abortion, there are pro-choice groups supporting 
the bill. They cannot be forced to accept language precluding 
their arguments, any more than pro-life groups can be forced to 
accept language precluding pro-life arguments. The way for the 
bill to be abortion-neutral is not to mention abortion a t  all. The 
legislative history should simply say (1) that the pro-life side 
can make its arguments that no abortions are religiously moti- 
vated and that in a world without Casey, Roe, or the Freedom 
of Choice Act, protecting unborn life is obviously a compelling 
interest; (2) that the pro-choice side can make its arguments 
that at least some abortions are religiously motivated and that 
protection of fetuses is not a compelling interest; and (3) that 
Congress has merely enacted the standard for decision and has 
not codified either set of answers. 
In a world with Casey, Roe, or the Freedom of Choice Act, 
75. St. Agnes Hosp. v. Riddick, 748 F. Supp. 319 (D. Md. 1990); see supra note 
14 and accompanying text. 
76. See, e.g., House Hearings, supra note 56, at 411, 416-17 (memorandum of 
Agudath Israel of America (May 14, 1992)). 
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those arguments are irrelevant. In a world without Casey, Roe, 
or the Freedom of Choice Act, the pro-life side will win those 
arguments. But neither side should be able to say that Con- 
gress codified its position. The bill as drafted is abortion- 
neutral, and unless there is a compromise with broad support, 
Congress should keep the bill as it was originally introduced. 
B. Tax Exemption 
The law regarding tax exemption is relatively settled. Reli- 
gious organizations cannot be given tax exemptions exclusively 
for religion, but they can be included in broader tax-exempt 
categories such as the religious, charitable, scientific, and edu- 
cational organizations mentioned in the Internal Revenue 
Code? 
With respect to any particular organization's eligibility for 
a tax exemption, a safe generalization from the cases is that no 
plaintiff has standing to litigate the tax liability of another 
taxpayer? Cases challenging tax exemptions of churches, 
schools, and hospitals have had multiple plaintiffs with re- 
sourceful lawyers; if none of them could find a plaintiff with 
standing, it probably cannot be done. The Second Circuit's 
opinion in In re United States Catholic Conference holds out the 
possibility of an exception someday,79 but that theoretical pos- 
sibility would not be a free exercise exception and it is not rele- 
vant to RFRA. The Catholic Conference litigation imposed an 
enormous burden on the Catholic Church; I joined with other 
lawyers in filing an amicus brief supporting the Church, and I 
fully support the Church's desire never to repeat that experi- 
ence. But the fact is that the Church won, and there is no need 
to  re-fight that war. The opinions that so burdened the Church 
in that litigation relied on the Establishment Clause and the 
Equal Protection Clause; no court at any stage of that litigation 
relied on the Free Exercise Clause. RFRA would not be a basis 
77. Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 US. 1 (1989); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 
397 U.S. 664 (1970). 
78. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750-66 (1984); Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare 
Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 37-46 (1976); In re United States Catholic Conference, 
885 F.2d 1020, 1024-31 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. denied sub nom. Abortion Rights Mobi- 
lization, Inc. v. United States Catholic Conference, 495 U.S. 918 (1990). 
79. In re United States Catholic Conference, 885 F.2d at 1031; see also Simon, 
426 U.S. at 36-37 (in the first of this series of cases, reserving the question wheth- 
er to announce an absolute rule that only the taxpayer and the government could 
have standing). 
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for litigation over tax exemptions. 
C. Public Funding 
Challenges to public funding of religious institutions have 
always been litigated under the Establishment Clause. The 
Establishment Clause directly addresses the funding issue, and 
the Court has created a special standing rule for Establishment 
Clause claims to facilitate that litigation?' An occasional liti- 
gant has asserted in the alternative that such expenditures 
also violate the Free Exercise Clause, but the Supreme Court 
has twice summarily rejected those claims.s1 The Court con- 
sidered an analogous claim at  greater length in United States 
v. Lee, and held unanimously that the Free Exercise Clause 
gives taxpayers no right "to challenge the tax system because 
tax payments were spent in a manner that violates their reli- 
gious belief," and that "religious belief in conflict with the pay- 
ment of taxes affords no basis for resisting the tax."82 This 
conclusion was based on the compelling interest test, the same 
defense that is written into RFRA. 
The argument for a public funding amendment is, there- 
fore, even more bizarre than the argument for an abortion 
amendment. The Court has repeatedly limited public funding 
to religious bodies under the Establishment Clause; it has 
squarely rejected free exercise complaints about the expendi- 
ture of tax funds to support religion or any other program to 
which a taxpayer has religious objections. The fear was that 
the Court will change its mind--on both issues-in opposite 
directions. Perhaps the Court will overrule its Establishment 
Clause cases and permit more public funding for religious bod- 
ies, and also overrule its Free Exercise Clause cases and say 
that  RFRA forbids the public fiulding that the Court just per- 
mitted under the Establishment Clause. It is hard to imagine a 
less plausible pair of doctrinal developments. 
D. The Establishment Clause Proviso 
The bill's erstwhile opponents also objected to R F W s  
section seven, which provides that nothing in the bill "shall be 
80. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 102-06 (1968). 
81. Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 689 (1971) (plurality opinion); Board of 
Educ. v. Allen, 392 US.  236, 248-49 (1968). 
82. 455 U S .  252, 260 (1982). 
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construed to affect, interpret, or in any way address" the Estab- 
lishment Clause. The reason for this proviso is the same as the 
reason for not saying anything about particular free exercise 
claims. The supporters of the bill agree on the principle of free 
exercise, but disagree on particular applications, and disagree 
even about the basic principle of the Establishment Clause. 
Those disputed issues are carefully excluded from a bill de- 
signed simply to enact the one fundamental principle on which 
nearly everyone agrees. 
All sides to Establishment Clause disputes can continue to 
argue their positions. Those so inclined can continue to argue 
that the Establishment Clause is merely a redundant append- 
age to the Free Exercise Clause. This bill does not reject that 
argument any more than it rejects the argument of strict 
separationists. RFRA is quite explicit; it says nothing about the 
Establishment Clause. The fear that this proviso will codify 
current interpretations of the Establishment Clause borders on 
the irrational. That is plainly not what section seven says; a 
bill cannot codify something that it does not affect, interpret, or 
even address. 
VII. CONGRESSIONAL POWER 
A. The Reach of Congressional Power 
Congress has power to enact RFRA under Section Five of 
the Fourteenth Amend~nent .~~  Repeated majorities of the Su- 
preme Court have upheld analogous exercises of congressional 
power to enforce the Reconstruction amendments. Section Five 
gives Congress, with respect to the Fourteenth Amendment, 
"the same broad powers expressed in the Necessary and Proper 
Clause" with respect to Article I?4 "Whatever legislation is 
appropriate, that is, adapted to carry out the objects the 
amendments have in view," is within the power of Congress, 
unless prohibited by some other provision of the Constitu- 
t i ~ n . ~ '  Similar enforcement provisions in Section Two of the 
Thirteenth and Fifteenth Amendments have been given similar 
interpretations, and the cases are often cited interchange- 
83. For a more detailed analysis of congressional power to enact RFRA, see 
Matt Pawa, Comment, When the Supreme Court Restricts Constitutional Rights, 
Can Congress Save US? An Examination of Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
141 U. PA. L. REV. 1029 (1993). 
84. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 650 (1966). 
85. Ex par& Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 345-46 (1879). 
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ably.86 
Power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment also includes 
power to enforce the Free Exercise Clause and other provisions 
of the Bill of Rights that are applied to the states through the 
Fourteenth Amendment. Congress has enacted other legislation 
to enforce the provisions of the Bill of Rights, most obviously 42 
U.S.C. $5 1983 and 1988; these provisions have been used to 
enforce the First, Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth Amendments, as 
incorporated through the Fourteenth, in thousands of cases. 
The Supreme Court has routinely decided these cases, usually 
without even noting the source of congressional power. The 
Court did note the source of congressional power in Hutto v. 
Finney,'? an Eighth Amendment case in which the Court re- 
lied on Congress's Section Five power to override state sover- 
eign immunity. 
What may make RFRA seem anomalous at first blush is 
that it appears t o  attempt to overrule the Supreme Court's 
decision in Smith. But RFRA would not overrule the Court; 
rather, it would create a statutory right where the Court de- 
clined to  create a constitutional right. This distinction is not a 
mere formality; it has real consequences that are explored 
below. Furthermore, there is nothing unusual about Congress 
exercising its Section Five power in this fashion. 
The express congressional power to "enforce" the Four- 
teenth Amendment is independent of the judicial power to 
adjudicate cases and controversies arising under it. Congress is 
not confined "to the insignificant role of abrogating only those 
state laws that the judicial branch was prepared t o  adjudge 
uncon~titutional.'"~ Thus, Congress may sometimes provide 
statutory protection for constitutional values that the Supreme 
Court is unwilling or unable to protect on its own authority. 
The Court agreed unanimously on this point in Metro Broad- 
casting, Inc. v. FCC.89 
This power is clearly illustrated by the various Voting 
Rights Acts, in which Congress has forbidden discriminatory 
practices that the Supreme Court had been prepared t o  toler- 
86. See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 US.  448, 477 (1980) (plurality opinion); id. 
at 500 (Powell, J., concurring); City of Rome v. United States, 446 US .  156, 207 
n. 1 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
87. 437 U.S. 678, 693-99 (1978). 
88. Katzenbach, 384 U.S. at 649. 
89. 497 US .  547, 563-66 (1990) (majority opinion); id. at 605-07 (07Connor, J., 
dissenting). 
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ate. The Supreme Court has held that literacy tests for voting 
do not violate the Equal Protection C l a ~ s e , ~ '  but that Con- 
gress may ban literacy tests for voting?' Similarly, the Court 
has held that electoral practices with racially discriminatory 
effect do not violate the C o n s t i t ~ t i o n , ~ ~  but that Congress may 
forbid such practices pursuant to its Section Five  power^?^ 
Similarly, much of the law of private racial discrimination 
depends on Congress's analogous powers under Section Two of 
the Thirteenth Amendment. No one would suggest that the 
Supreme Court could, on its own authority to adjudicate cases 
arising under the Thirteenth Amendment, prohibit all private 
discrimination in the making of contracts or in the sale and 
ownership of property. There is no case rejecting such a claim 
because no one has been bold enough to present it. But Con- 
gress has banned all such discrimination pursuant to its power 
to enforce the A m e n d m e ~ ~ t . ~ ~  
These holdings were not limited-indeed, they were implic- 
itly reaffirmed-by Patterson u. McLean Credit U n i ~ n ? ~  
Patterson unanimously reaffirmed earlier holdings that the 
Reconstruction civil rights acts forbid private discrimination, 
which necessarily assumes that Congress has power to forbid 
private discrimination not forbidden by the Constitution itself. 
The controversial holding in Patterson went only to the range 
of private conduct covered by the statute; the case cast no 
doubt on the constitutional rule that Congress can reach pri- 
vate discrimination pursuant to its power to enforce the Thir- 
teenth Amendment. Congress overrode the statutory holding in  
the Civil Rights Act of 1991,'~ and this legislation is also 
based on the congressional power to enforce the Reconstruction 
amendments. 
A conservative majority also reaffirmed congressional pow- 
90. Lassiter v. Northampto-n County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 50-54 (1959). 
91. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 118, 131-34, 14447, 216-17, 231-36, 
282 -84 (1970) (five separate opinions, collectively joined by all nine Justices); 
Gaston County v. United States, 395 U.S. 285, 293-97 (1969); Katzenbach v. Mor- 
gan, 384 U.S. 641, 649-58 (1966); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 333- 
34 (1966). 
92. City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 61-65 (1980). 
93. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986); City of Rome v. United States, 
446 U.S. 156, 172-83 (1980). 
94. Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 179 (1976); Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer 
Co., 392 U.S. 409, 43744 (1968). 
95. 491 U.S. 164, 171-75 (1989). 
96. 42 U.S.C. $ 1981(b) (Supp. I1 1991). 
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er to go beyond the Court's own interpretations in City of Rich- 
mond u. J.A. Croson Co." Justice O'Connor's plurality opin- 
ion, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice White stat- 
ed: "[Tlhe power to  'enforce' may at times also include the pow- 
er to  define situations which Congress determines threaten 
principles of equality and to adopt prophylactic rules to deal 
with those  situation^."'^ Justices Kennedy and Scalia recog- 
nized the accuracy of the plurality's account,gg but questioned 
its application to racial preferences. As Justice Kennedy put it, 
''[Tlhe process by which a law that is an equal protection viola- 
tion when enacted by a State becomes transformed to an equal 
protection guarantee when enacted by Congress poses a diffi- 
cult proposition for me.""' Justices Brennan, Marshall, 
Blackmun, and Stevens did not reach the Section Five issue. 
Most recently, in Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC,"' the 
Court relied on Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment to 
explain why Congress may, but state and local governments 
may not, authorize preferences for racial minorities without a 
finding of past di~crimination."~ The Court has never said 
that the Constitution requires such preferences of its own force. 
All nine Justices in Metro Broadcasting recognized Congress's 
Section Five powers to go beyond the limits of Supreme Court 
decisions; the Justices' only disagreement was over the rele- 
vance of that power to  a law that applied only to  the work of a 
federal agency. The majority relied on Section Five to  uphold 
racial preferences in the award of broadcast licenses. The four 
dissenters thought that Section Five was irrelevant to  the case 
because the Fourteenth Amendment applies only to  the states. 
But they recognized that "Congress has considerable latitude, 
presenting special concerns for judicial review, when it exercis- 
es its 'unique remedial powers under 5 5.' "Io3 
97. 488 U.S. 469 (1989). 
98. Id. at 490. 
99. Id. at 518 (Kennedy, J., concurring); id. at 521 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
100. Id. at 518. 
101. 497 US. 547 (1990). 
102. Compare Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 563-66 and Fullilove v. Klutznick, 
448 U.S. 448, 476-78 (1980) (plurality opinion) with Croson, 488 U.S. at 486-91 
(plurality opinion) and Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986). 
103. Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 605 (quoting Croson, 488 U.S. at 488 (plu- 
rality opinion)). 
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B. The Limits of Congressional Power 
Only a few opinions suggest limits to the reach of congres- 
sional power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment. The most 
obvious limit is that Congress may not "restrict, abrogate, or 
dilute" the protections of the Bill of Rights in the guise of en- 
forcing them.'" Thus, Congress cannot evade Supreme Court 
decisions protecting constitutional rights, although it can sup- 
plement Supreme Court decisions refusing to  protect constitu- 
tional rights. It is this limitation that fuels Justice Kennedy's 
doubts about congressionally mandated racial preferences. If 
racial preferences actually violate the Equal Protection Clause, 
as he apparently believes, then mandating these violations of 
the Clause is not a means of enforcing the clause. Similar con- 
cerns appear to underlie the dissenters' insistence in Metro 
Broadcasting that Congress may mandate racial preferences 
only to remedy past discriminati~n.'~~ In the dissenters' view, 
any broader rationale for racial preferences would violate the 
Clause rather than enforce it. 
Second, congressional power under Section Five is subject 
t o  other express allocations of power in the Constitution. Thus, 
in Oregon v. Mit~hel l '~~ a majority of the Court invalidated a 
provision requiring states to extend voting rights t o  citizens age 
eighteen and over.l0' The Justices in the majority concluded 
that the text of the Constitution or the clear intent of the 
founders reserved to  the states the power to  determine the 
qualifications of their own electors, subject only to  the express 
amendments concerning race, sex, and poll taxes. 
Third, Congress may not assert its Section Five powers as 
a sham to achieve ends unrelated to the Fourteenth Amend- 
ment. Congress may not act under Section Five where it does 
not believe that a constitutional right is at stake, or perhaps 
where no plausible claim could be made that a constitutional 
right is at stake. This is the point of the dissenting opinion in 
EEOC v. Wyoming,lo8 which rejected congressional power t o  
104. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 n.10 (1966). 
105. Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 607-08 (O'Connor, J., dissenting, joined by 
Rehnquist, C.J., and Scalia & Kennedy, JJ.) 
106. 400 U.S. 112, 117-18 (1970). 
107. Id. at 124-31, 154-213, 293-96 (three opinions joined by Burger, C.J., & 
Black, Harlan, Stewart & Blackmun, JJ.). 
108. 460 U.S. 226, 259-63 (1983) (Burger, C.J., dissenting, joined by Powell, 
Rehnquist & O'Connor, JJ.). 
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prohibit mandatory retirement for state employees. The hssent 
said: "Congress may act only where a violation lurks. The flaw 
in the Commission's analysis is that in this instance, no 
one-not the Court, not the Congress-has determined that 
mandatory retirement plans violate any rights protected by 
these Amend~nents."'~~ The opinion pointed to congressional 
enactment and retention of mandatory retirement for several 
classifications of federal employees to show that Congress did 
not think that mandatory retirement was unconstitutional. But 
the dissent recognized that the Court's decisions "allow Con- 
gress a degree of flexibility in deciding what the Fourteenth 
Amendment  safeguard^.""^ The majority upheld the statute 
on Commerce Clause grounds and did not speak to the Section 
Five issues. 
RFRA does not run afoul of these limitations. First, there 
is no plausible claim that the Act would violate the Court's 
interpretation of the Establishment Clause or any other right 
incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment. Smith reaffirms 
that legislative exemptions to protect religious exercise are 
"expected, . . . permitted, or even . . . desirable.""' The Court 
unanimously rejected an  Establishment Clause challenge to 
legislative exemptions in Corporation of the Presiding Bishop v. 
Amos. ' l2 
Second, RFRA would not interfere with any other express 
allocation of power in the Constitution. The Federal Constitu- 
tion does not recognize or preserve any specific state power to 
burden the exercise of religion. The state regulatory powers 
that would be affected by the proposed Act are part of the gen- 
eral reserve of state powers, N l y  subject to the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 
Third, RFRA does not assert Fourteenth Amendment pow- 
er where there is no plausible Fourteenth Amendment claim. 
For some members of Congress, this is a critical distinction 
between RFRA and the proposed Freedom of Choice Act. If you 
believe that the Constitution properly interpreted protects a 
woman's right to choose abortion, then both RFRA and the 
Freedom of Choice Act are within congressional power under 
Section Five. But if you believe that the Constitution properly 
109. Id. at 260 (footnote omitted). 
110. Id. at 262. 
111. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990) (citations omitted). 
112. 483 U.S. 327, 334-40 (1987). 
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interpreted simply says nothing about abortion, or that the 
Constitution protects the unborn child's right to life, then you 
believe that there is no Fourteenth Amendment violation lurk- 
ing for Congress to address in the Freedom of Choice Act. Thus, 
pro-life legislators can with complete intellectual consistency 
support RFRA and oppose the Freedom of Choice Act on consti- 
tutional grounds. 
There is, however, a constitutional violation to be remedied 
by RFRA. RFRA would enforce the constitutional rule against 
laws prohibiting the free exercise of religion. Congress can act 
on the premise that the exercise of religion includes religiously 
motivated conduct. Even the Supreme Court recognizes that 
much. The Court interprets the Constitution of its own force to 
protect religiously motivated acts from regulation that discrimi- 
nates against religion and from regulation motivated by hostili- 
ty to religion in general or to a particular religion. "[Tlhe 'exer- 
cise of religion' often involves not only belief and profession but 
the performance of (or abstention from) physical acts."l13 
From the perspective of believers whose religious exercise 
has been prohibited, it makes little difference whether the 
prohibition is found in a discriminatory law or in  a neutral law 
of general applicability. Either way, they must abandon their 
faith or risk imprisonment and persecution. Either way, it  is 
undeniably true that their religious exercise has been prohibit- 
ed. RFRA would protect the right to free exercise against inad- 
vertent, insensitive, and incidental prohibitions as well as 
against discriminatory and hostile prohibitions. 
Thus RFRA parallels important provisions of the Voting 
Rights Acts, also enacted under Section Five. The Supreme 
Court construed the constitutional protection for minority vot- 
ing rights to require proof of overt discrimination or racial 
motive on the part of government officials. Congress dispensed 
with the requirements of overt discrimination or motive, and 
required state and local governments to justify laws that bur- 
den minority voting rights. Similarly here, the Court requires 
proof of overt discrimination or anti-religious motive to make 
out a free exercise violation; RFRA would dispense with those 
requirements and require government to justify any burden on 
religious practice. RFRA is within the scope of congressional 
power for the same reasons that the Voting Rights Acts are 
113. Smith, 494 U.S. at 877. 
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within the scope of congressional power. 
Congress can find as a fact that judicial review of legisla- 
tive motive is an insufficient protection against religious perse- 
cution by means of formally neutral laws. Legislative motive is 
often unknowable. Legislatures may be wholly indifferent to 
the needs of a minority faith, and yet not reveal overt legisla- 
tive hostility. When a religious minority opposes a bill, or seeks 
an  exemption on the ground that a bill requires immoral con- 
duct, it is hard to distinguish religious hostility fiom political 
conflict. Even when there is clear religious hostility, courts are 
reluctant to impute bad motives to legislators. Religious minor- 
ities are no safer than racial minorities if their rights depend 
on persuading a federal judge to condemn the government's 
motives. 
In the Voting Rights Acts, Congress found that facially 
neutral laws could be used to deprive minorities of the right to 
vote or to dilute their vote, and that legislative motives were 
easily hidden so that proof of discriminatory motive was not a 
workable means of protecting minority voting rights. Similarly, 
Congress can find that facially neutral laws are readily used to 
suppress religious practice, that at times such laws have been 
instruments of active religious persecution, that proof of anti- 
religious motive is not a workable means of protecting religious 
liberty, and that legislating individual exemptions in every 
statute and a t  every level of government is not a workable 
means of protecting religious liberty. 
C. The Complementary Roles of the Separate Branches 
The Supreme Court's reason for not requiring government 
to justify all burdens on religious practice is institutional. The 
opinion in Smith is quite clear that the Court does not want 
final responsibility for applying the compelling interest test to 
religious conduct. The majority does not want a system "in 
which judges weigh the social importance of all laws against 
the centrality of all religious beliefs."ll4 To say that an ex- 
emption for religious exercise "is permitted, or even that it is 
desirable, is not to say that it is constitutionally required, and 
that the appropriate occasions for its creation can be discerned 
by the  court^.""^ 
114. Id. at 890 (emphasis added); see also id. at 889 n.5. 
115. Id. at 890 (emphasis added). 
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These institutional concerns do not apply to RFRA. Con- 
gress, rather than the Court, will make the decision that reli- 
gious exercise should sometimes be exempted from generally 
applicable laws. And Congress, rather than the Court, will 
retain the ultimate responsibility for the continuation and 
interpretation of that decision. 
Of course, the courts would apply the compelling interest 
test under the Act, and judges would be required to balance the 
importance of government policies against the burden on reli- 
gious exercise. But striking this balance in the enforcement of a 
statute is fundamentally different from striking this balance in  
the independent judicial enforcement of the Constitution. Un- 
der the statute, the judicial striking of the balance is not final. 
If the Court strikes the balance in an unacceptable way, Con- 
gress can respond with new legislation. Congress may amend 
RFRA to add specific protection for certain religious practices 
despite the Court's finding of a compelling interest, or to repeal 
statutory protection for certain religious practices despite the 
Court's finding of no compelling interest. 
Thus, RFRA would protect religious exercise that  the Court 
felt unable to protect on its own authority, and it would solve 
the institutional problem that inhibited the Court from acting 
independently. The difficulties the Court identified in Smith 
are a perfect illustration of the need for independent power, in  
both the judiciary and the Congress, to enforce the Bill of 
Rights. 
Our Constitution addresses the Madisonian dilemma of 
protecting the minority from the majority without subjecting 
the majority to control by the minority. The Court's insulation 
from the normal political processes is an essential virtue in 
protecting the minority. But in the difficult balancing of inter- 
ests required by some free exercise cases, the Court now feels 
the need for a majoritarian voice. Because of the size and diver- 
sity of the national polity, Congress can provide more reliable 
majoritarian protection for individual rights than the states 
can. 
By creating judicially enforceable statutory rights, Con- 
gress can call on judicial powers that the Court feared to in- 
voke on its own. Because the rights created would be statutory, 
116. For a recent judicial explanation of this essential Madisonian idea, see City 
of Richmond v. JA.  Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 522-24 (1989) (Scalia, J., concur- 
ring). 
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Congress can retain a voice that it could not have retained had 
the Court acted on its own. By legislating generally, for all 
religions, instead of case by case for particular religions, Con- 
gress can reduce the danger that it will not respond to the 
needs of small or unpopular faiths. If the Court and Congress 
cooperate in this way, then the oppression of small faiths need 
not be, as the Court feared, an "unavoidable consequence of 
democratic govern~nent."~~' 
VIII. THE DANGER OF RFRA 
The possibility of amendments to RFRA should be reassur- 
ing to a Court that doubts its own capacity to authoritatively 
balance competing interests, but it is also the weak spot of the 
legislation. Protection for religious liberty was placed in the 
Constitution in order to insulate religious liberty from shifts in 
political majorities. Making the protection statutory necessarily 
subjects religious liberty to shifting political majorities. The 
great danger is that in some time of public excitement, Con- 
gress may amend RFRA to deny protection t o  an unpopular 
religious practice, or that some interest group may successfully 
demand an amendment denying protection to  any religious 
practices that inconvenience or offend it. Congress should resist 
such amendments; it should recognize that RFRA is a quasi- 
constitutional statute that should not be lightly amended. But 
the danger of such amendments is real. This danger is not a 
consequence of RFRA; it is a consequence of Employment Diui- 
sion v. Smith.ll8 Religious liberty was committed into the 
hands of shifting political majorities precisely to  the extent that 
the Court withdrew judicial protection under the Constitution. 
But RFRA may aggravate the problem in one way. Once 
RFRA is enacted, all cases will be litigated under the statute, 
and the Court will have no occasion to reconsider Smith. If the 
religious claim prevails under the statute, there will be no need 
to reach the constitutional issue. If the religious claim does not 
prevail under the statute, it cannot prevail under any plausible 
constitutional test-not under Smith and not under the com- 
pelling interest test-so there is still no need to reconsider 
Smith. RFRA may eliminate whatever chance exists of correct- 
ing the constitutional law of free exercise. 
117. Smith, 494 U.S. at 890. 
118. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
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This is a cost to the proponents of religious liberty. But it 
is not a large cost, because there is little near-term prospect 
that the Court will reconsider Smith. All five members of the 
Smith majority are still on the C~urt, ' '~ although one has an- 
nounced his retirement.l2' Two of the dissenters have re- 
tired,12' and a third has announced his intention to retire 
soon.'" Chief Justice RehnquistlB and Justices White,'* 
st even^,'^^ and S ~ a l i a ' ~ ~  have voted for Smith or something 
very like it more than once. Lawyers with religious liberty 
claims have so far sought to fit within Smith rather than ask 
the Court to overrule it. In the one free exercise case decided 
since Smith,ln the Court found flagrant anti-religious dis- 
crimination, and therefore had no need t o  reconsider Smith. 
The two remaining Justices from the Smith minority adhered 
to their  position^,'^^ and Justice Souter wrote a long scholarly 
concurrence, arguing that Smith had little precedential value 
and that it should be reconsidered on the next appropriate 
occasion.'" But six Justices appeared to treat Smith as set- 
tled law, without even a perfundory acknowledgment that this 
was not the occasion to address the issues raised in Souter's 
conc~rrence.'~~ This dictum should not be accepted as legiti- 
mately resolving the issue, or even as necessarily predicting 
the future votes of all who joined it. But it appears that Smith 
has six votes for now, and that it will still have five after Jus- 
tice White's retirement. 
President Clinton's nominees to the Court might be more 
sympathetic to  civil liberties claims generally, and to  religious 
119. Rehnquist, C.J., and Scalia, White, Stevens, & Kennedy, JJ. 
120. Greenhouse, supra note 63. 
121. Brennan & Marshall, JJ. 
122. Blackmun Sees an End of His Career on Court, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 1993, 
at  7. 
123. Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 703-32 (1986) (plurality opinion); Thomas v. 
Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 722-23 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
124. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 282 (1981) (white, J., dissenting). 
125. United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 262-63 & n.3 (1982) (Stevens, J., con- 
curring). 
126. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2456, 2463, 2467 (1991) (Scalia, J., 
concurring). 
127. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 113 S. Ct. 2217 
(1993). 
128. Id. at  2250 (Blackmun, J., joined by O ' C o ~ o r ,  J., concurring in the judg- 
ment). 
129. Id. at 2240 (Souter, J., concurring). 
130. Id. at 2226. 
256 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I993 
liberty claims in particular, but there is no guarantee. As Jus- 
tice Stevens' vote in Smith illustrates, some civil libertarians 
have a blind spot for religious liberty. Moreover, not all Justic- 
es who think Smith was wrong would necessarily vote to over- 
rule it; a vote to overrule also depends on a Justice's theory of 
stare decisis, and probably on just how obviously wrong he or 
she thinks Smith is. Even assuming no blind spots, no stare 
decisis, and no Presidential mistakes, it will take several 
Clinton appointments to move the center of the Court, and it 
might take several appointments to produce a majority for 
overruling Smith. RFRA may cut off this speculative prospect 
of overruling Smith, but that is a small cost to pay for certain 
and immediate statutory protection for religious liberty. 
The cost is merely theoretical until and unless RFRA is 
amended to exclude some set of claims from the statute. But 
such an amendment would make the cost real and perhaps 
onerous. Suppose for example that Congress amended RFRA to 
exclude its application to any public school. Lawyers represent- 
ing school children and their parents would then base their 
arguments on the Constitution. To prevail, they would have to 
persuade the Court to overrule Smith, and also persuade the 
Court that the school's restriction on their clients' religious 
exercise served no compelling interest. But the school would 
argue that Congress's specific exclusion of schools from the 
statute indicated a considered judgment by a co-equal branch 
that suppression of religious minorities in the public schools is 
necessary to the states' compelling interest in education. If the 
Court treated this argument as plausible, the religious minori- 
ties might be worse off under RFRA as amended than they 
would have been without RFRA at  all. 
The danger of precluding reconsideration of the constitu- 
tional question is a strong reason for Congress to reject pro- 
posed amendments that would exclude religious claims. And if 
Congress does enact such an amendment, courts should be 
alert to the danger that the constitutional question will not be 
fully considered in either branch. Courts should not assume 
that  an  amendment to RFRA represents a considered judgment 
about the scope of religious liberty or about the government's 
compelling interest in a particular context. Depending on its 
political context, such an amendment may represent a wholly 
unprincipled expression of temporary political passion, a tacti- 
cal victory by some interest group or bureaucracy that placed 
no value on the costs to religious liberty, or even a concession 
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to such forces by legislators who hoped the courts would do the 
right thing and turn to the Constitution to protect the affected 
religious minorities. 
Any such controversy is far in the hture, and its circum- 
stances cannot be anticipated now, but two points are indisput- 
able. First, RFRA does not repeal the Free Exercise Clause. 
Second, the issue decided in Smith was neither presented nor 
briefed by any party or amicus. If at some point in the future a 
free exercise issue arises that is not covered by RFRA, the 
constitutional issue will be open, and the Court should give it 
full consideration. 
IX. CONCLUSION 
The generation that came of age in roughly the quarter- 
century after Brown u. Board of  ducati ion'^' has too readily 
assumed that only courts can protect constitutional liberty. But 
part of the genius of separation of powers is that all three 
branches can protect liberty when motivated to do so.lS2 For 
the last ten years or so, Congress has been more interested in 
protecting liberty than the Court has been, and this pattern 
may continue for some time into the future. One reading of the 
current Court is that it is not hostile to liberty, but that it is 
deeply committed to the view that Congress should take the 
lead. 
RFRA would be an exercise of congressional power to pro- 
tect liberty in default of the Court's doing so on the direct au- 
thority of the Constitution. This protection would be applied to 
cases in which the states, federal agencies, or even Congress 
itself have burdened religious exercise without compelling ne- 
cessity. Such a statute should not be viewed as an oddity. 
Rather, it would be our constitutional and political system at 
its best. 
The Constitution embodies some of our highest ideals. It 
makes those ideals judicially enforceable for fear that the polit- 
ical majority, in pursuit of self-interest or in succumbing t o  
baser motives, will not always live up to  its ideals. The nation's 
history of religious liberty and pluralism shows that the ideal 
of religious liberty runs deep, and the history of religious bigot- 
ry and intermittent persecution shows that the tendency to  
131. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
132. For historical examples, see Laycock, supra note .50, at 1728-29. 
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violate the ideal also runs deep. RFRA would be an example of 
the majority acting to enforce a constitutional ideal, and that 
could only be good for the constitutional system. 
